[George Gillespie] argues that although arguments and consequences are drawn by deductive reason, the resulting consequent is not believed by the power of reason but because it is “the truth and will of God.” According to his citation from Cameron, Gillespie argues that reason is an instrument in this process, not the foundation of the argument (J.V. Fesko, The Theology of the Westminster Standards: Historical Context & Theological Insights, 88).

In the era of orthodoxy, the issues of drawing conclusions from the text of Scripture in order ot establish doctrinal points was debated by the Reformed against the Arminians and Socinians in particular who, in the estimation of the Reformed, refused to allow full use this interpretive device largely because it could establish orthodoxy against their teachings. The proper use of consequences assumes that, “Necessary consequences form the written Word of God do sufficiently and strongly prove the consequent or conclusion, if theoretical, to be a certain divine truth which ought to be believed, and, if practical, to be a necessary duty which we are obliged unto jure divino” [quotation from George Gillespie, A Treatise of Miscellany Questions, 238] (Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 2, 497).

Argument, If we say that necessary consequences from Scripture prove not a jus divinum, we say that which is inconsistent with the infinite wisdom of God, for although necessary consequences may be drawn from a man’s word which do not agree with his mind and intention, and so men are oftentimes ensnared by their words; yet (as Camero well noteth) God being infinitely wise, it were a blasphemous opinion, to hold that any thing can be drawn from his holy word, which is not his will. This were to make the only wise God as foolish as man, that cannot foresee all things which will follow from his words. Therefore we must needs hold, ’tis the mind of God which necessary followeth from the word of God (George Gillespie, A Treatise of Miscellany Questions, 243).