Book Review: John Calvin’s American Legacy – Conclusion: John Calvin at “Home” in American Culture

Chapter 11 review here. Chapter 10 review here. Chapter 9 review here. Chapter 8 review here. Chapter 7 review here. Chapter 6 review here. Chapter 5 review here. Chapter 4 review here. Chapter 3 review here. Chapter 2 review here. Chapter 1 review here. Introduction review here. Initial thoughts here.

Thomas J. Davis, who edited this book, pens the final ado; it is an apt conclusion and he does it in just under four pages to boot! Kudos to Davis for writing a real conclusion; kudos for not giving in to the temptation of penning a verbose editorial tome.

In the Introduction, Davis stated that “the point of this book is that, despite all of the changes and challenges; despite Calvinism’s ultimate failure to hold the American consciousness . . . the fact remains that Calvinism in America has had an impact on American society and culture in every century, even if at times it has gone unrecognized. And behind Calvinism stands Calvin” (11). This book has certainly pointed that very thing out; each of the authors has provided an excellent article highlighting Calvin’s significance and the permanence of Calvin’s legacy in America, a legacy that has made its mark upon American culture, theology, and literature.

Davis’ “short conclusion” utilizes the work of Marilynne Robinson–whose “attempt to restore Calvin to a place in the American consciousness free from stereotypes” (13) is a perfect capstone to the proceeding eleven chapters. Davis examines several works by Robinson and quickly tells how she has put forth the effort to have Calvin “reinsert[ed] . . . into the cultural conversation,” displaying her “concern for the dignity and well-being of the human creature in Calvin’s thought–and the thoughts of his heirs–that could well serve as a bulwark against the dehumanizing and depersonalizing forces of the modern world” (268). In Robinson’s work, which oftentimes meditates on the relations between fathers, families, and friends, the “house” and “home” are landscape-ish, they function as the perfect context and backdrop within which to best display Calvin and Calvinism. Davis echoes Robinson’s artistic imagination, concurring that: 

Calvinism wrapped up in family rather than abstraction appears more genuinely human and, thus, acceptable. Perhaps through the work of Robinson, it will be easier to think of John Calvin and Calvinism as being at home in the American consciousness–as one of many influences that should have a recognized seat at the family table of American traditions (270). 

Book Review: John Calvin’s American Legacy – Chapter 11 – Cold Comforts: John Updike, Protestant Thought, and the Semantics of Paradox

Chapter 10 review here. Chapter 9 review here. Chapter 8 review here. Chapter 7 review here. Chapter 6 review here. Chapter 5 review here. Chapter 4 review here. Chapter 3 review here. Chapter 2 review here. Chapter 1 review here. Introduction review here. Initial thoughts here.

Kyle A. Pasewark opens his article on Protestant/Calvinistic thought and author John Updike with a zinger of an observation: “Americans are not a people whose palates are sensitive to the taste of paradox.” Pasewark, unflinchingly, elaborates:

The strong and unambiguous flavors of progressivism, optimism, pessimism—all, in their way, opposites of paradox—are more our style, and we prefer them laid on a plate, or at the buffet stand, clearly distinguished [emphasis CCS] from one another so that we can have one flavor at a time rather than components stacked upon each other or flavors melded to confront us with first salty, then sweet, then both together (257).

If that doesn’t make you twinge, then consider the weight of Pasewark’s additional observation that Americans, precisely because of their Protestant heritage, ought to have a more developed palate:

This American preference is a little bit unexpected, since the United States is often portrayed—and portrays itself—as a “Christian nation,” and one would think that the key Christian and, even more, the central Protestant category of “paradox” would fare a little better in American culture, that “paradox” would be a word that one hears more frequently (257).

I must interject with affirmation: I rarely hear the word “paradox” when I am out-and-about. For example, I never hear the word “paradox” when I am at the grocery store in the north-most part of the Bible Belt, that is, in Warsaw/Winona Lake, Indiana, both cities with rich and deep heritage in American Revivalism—only miles form my residence is a Monument/Sanctuary dedicated to celebrating Billy Sunday’s life and work; and I never hear the word paradox when I am at work where I am employed by a Fortune 500 Company and where I interact with co-workers in markets spread out across 27 of the States . . . okay, that is not accurate, I have heard one individual use the term “paradox” but that was only once in the past two and half years—in that instance “paradox” was a word in cliché phrase he used to describe an intermittent network issue we were troubleshooting, so that doesn’t really count. I have only heard the word “paradox” used regularly in Wesleyan-Armenian circles during my days at university (Indiana Wesleyan University, Marion, IN), and then after college in Reformed – G. K. Chesterton-reading-and-chronically-quoting circles, which I now call home, that is, within the Communion of Reformed Evangelical Churches (CREC). All of that to simply say, Pasewark is correct—Americans are not a people whose palates are sensitive to the taste of paradox.
Pasewark strings together a collection of zingers like pearls on a necklace in the first 3 or 4 pages of his article. He says, “Nowhere is the American preference for the directness of the nonparadoxical more in evidence than in the American understanding of freedom.” He then goes on to dismantle the uncouthness of how most Americans think about freedom, for we, I mean Americans, “do not approach these contradictions [our use of freedom to indicate many things that we believe are all “good” but are in fact contradictory] as contradictions but as modalities of the same thing” (257). Pasewark, again, shows that Americans are not as sophisticated as we would like to think we are.
These comments prep the ground for Pasewark’s ensuing excavation, examining the “cold comforts” of John Updike, Protestant Thought, and the Semantics of Paradox. Pasewark begins with two premises: 1) “paradox is the fabric of John Updike’s fiction” (258), and 2) “the classic doctrine of election is paradoxical” (259). To understand the latter premise Pasewark reminds his audience, “one’s election [is] the condition for freedom, not its eradication” (259). Pasewark then goes into a couple examinations of characters from John Updike’s writings to illustrate what happens when people with nonparadoxical understandings of freedom worship freedom (like Americans often do), “as seekers of freedom, his major characters ask for nothing more than to be alone, but they still require others, and though they begin by demanding freedom, they become ugly dominators of others and, ultimately, self-destructive as well” (260). This perverse and bizarre nonparadoxical freedom is their highest good and becomes their religion, and as Pasewark comments, this type of freedom is “asocial and apolitical” (262). Pasewark also notes:

This lack of political consciousness is not a weakness in Updike’s work but an expression of his characters’ deepest American contemporaneousness. For them, too, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are personal, not social (263).

Pasewark follows up this thought with an additional comment, “This, too, is a reversal and cancellation of Calvinistic Protestantism from Geneva through the Puritans,” which means when you try to create a just society with men and women who live with the effects of their death nature and the sin of their federal head Adam, “the actualization of social and political life is not ecstatic but effortful” (263). This is why freedom is paradoxical—one’s election is the condition for freedom, for effort, for labor, etc., and it will be fruitful, productive. Contrast that with a nonparadoxical freedom, which, according to Pasewark, “devours not only itself but also the others whom it touches” (263).
Paswark then turns his eyes to the contemporary and provides examples of this naughty “freedom” running wild within American Republical political party (e.g. George W. Bush, activities of the CIA of late, etc.) and the resultant destructiveness. Bad “freedom is bad for people, personally, but also corporately, by that I mean bad “freedom” is bad for society. Personal and social havoc occurs when paradox is not the calibrating instrument of freedom, however, Pasewark tries to leave his audience with a hopeful thought:

. . . just how far from Calvin’s view of freedom and government “this great roughly rectangular country severed from Christ by the breadth of the sea” has come. We can hope, however, that the full glory of the ultimate destructiveness of the nonparadoxical understanding of freedom is now clear to us, and perhaps the way is clear for a conception of freedom that is both paradoxical and political (265).

ClearNote Fellowship 2012 Conference

Our family returned late yesterday evening from attending ClearNote Fellowship’s summer conference in Bloomington, Indiana. The conference title was “I Believe in God the Father Almighty” and you can follow the link for additional information on the speakers and topics from the various plenary and breakout session. I believe eventually they will post conference audio; if so, then I will add a follow-up post.

The conference was fun, Christian fellowship was rich, and our family fed well upon God’s Word. Many thanks to ClearNote Fellowship for putting this on and I highly recommend next year’s conference to anyone that might be interested and/or able to attend–2013 conference is “She [the Church] is Our Mother.”

Book Review: John Calvin’s American Legacy – Chapter 10 – “Jonathan Edwards, Calvin, Baxter & Co.”: Mark Twain and the Comedy of Calvinism

Chapter 9 review here. Chapter 8 review here. Chapter 7 review here. Chapter 6 review here. Chapter 5 review here. Chapter 4 review here. Chapter 3 review here. Chapter 2 review here. Chapter 1 review here. Introduction review here. Initial thoughts here.

Joe B. Fulton serves up an article piping hot with Twainian wit and comic relief that is, refreshingly, tossed with a respectable amount of sobriety. The article’s sub-heading comes from a comment by Twain:

In modern times the halls of heavens are warmed by registers connected with hell–& it is greatly applauded by Jonathan Edwards, Calvin, Baxter, & Co. because it adds a new pang to the sinner’s sufferings to know that the very fire which tortures him is the means of making the righteous comfortable (240).

Early on Fulton comments, “Twain delights in putting Calvinist definitions in the mouths of characters such as drunken miners and Satan” (241), but don’t let observations like this mislead you in to thinking that Fulton is leveraging Mark Twain’s literary legacy merely to bash him some Calvin. In fact, quite the opposite is at play.
Fulton argues that the “contribution” by Calvin(ism) to American literature has been (largely) misunderstood, e.g., “its [the contribution of Calvinism to American literature] influence is tracked inversely: American literature terminates, thrives, then flowers precisely as it sheds the dead husk of Calvinism in which it had been entombed” (242), and Fulton decries these literary histories written during the early twentieth century, the proponents of hasty inversion.
Contrarily, Fulton argues throughout his article that Mark Twain was “more alike than different” those men who contributed to the Calvinistic “husk” frowned upon by the early twentieth century literary historians, and that instead of being mere husk, “Jonathan Edwards, Calvin, Baxter, & Co.,” because they “[both Calvinist theology and Mark Twain] shared a theological vocabulary, metaphysical assumptions, and a view of God as sovereign. Their disagreements were substantial, but Mark Twain and the Calvinists were partners in the same enterprise” (253), is proof that Calvinism was a contributing (perhaps even a determinable) element of that savory kernel which is Twain’s comic voice. (Fulton provides plenty of examples from Twain’s catalog, both fiction and non-fiction, in support of his argument.)
Fulton is rather astute in all of this, and mentions, “Twain’s criticism of Edwards and Calvinism is so compelling because it is a disagreement among writers who share most of the same fundamental theological conceptions” (252). This is invaluable for understanding the contributory-relationship between Calvin(ism) and American literature. It is, however, important to note that Fulton acknowledges that Twain’s Calvinism is a “twisted version of Calvinist theology” (252), but this outlook only reinforces Fulton’s argument that Twain was not merely dismissing Calvinism as an author within the American literary tradition but took it seriously.
In interacting with Calvinistic theology, Twain’s wit and comedy was a true and serated edge, however, he is a far cry from the “shock and awe” which characterizes a villain from contemporary slasher/horror film—Twain’s slashes are purposeful, calculated, like the creative activity of the Triune God of Calvinistic Theology–Twain’s slashes are not random. This means, as Fulton says, “Twain’s grappling with Calvinism is earnest” (245).
My thoughts: I enjoyed this article. I have not read anything by Twain since middle school (and what I read at that time were the three or four classics), but Fulton has inspired to me to “take up and read” Twain, again. A lazy Saturday may be on the horizon, and, if so, then I feel that I may read me some Tom Sawyer.

Book Review: John Calvin’s American Legacy – Chapter 9 – Geneva’s Crystalline Clarity: Harriet Beecher Stowe and Max Weber on Calvinism and the American Character

Chapter 8 review here. Chapter 7 review here. Chapter 6 review here. Chapter 5 review here. Chapter 4 review here. Chapter 3 review here. Chapter 2 review here. Chapter 1 review here. Introduction review here. Initial thoughts here.

With chiastic-like structure, Peter J. Thuesen’s article opens and closes recounting the same historical scene: Harriet Beecher Stowe (author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin) visiting John Calvin’s Geneva, in June 1853. Stowe, who took a break for travel on the Continent during a publicity tour in England, wrote, while overlooking Geneva, “Calvinism, in its essential features, will never cease from the earth, because the great fundamental facts of nature are Calvinistic, and men with strong minds and wills always discover it” (219).

And so Thuesen begins his article, introducing Stowe’s judgments (both positive and negative) of Calvin and Calvinism, and to which he quickly adjoins similar judgments by the famous sociologist Max Weber (author of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism). Stowe’s and Weber’s relationship to their Calvinistic American heritage was not simple, Thuesen even calls the former’s a “tortured relationship”–but nevertheless a “recurring theme of her writings”–one which Thuesen believes “anticipated in striking ways the arguments” of Max Weber.

Thuesen reviews the works of both authors within their conflicted circumstances, which are twofold, first, primarily, their American context, and then, secondarily, within the context of their literary peers (Thuesen provides abundant examples of the anti-Calvinistic spirit in American literature at that time). In the midst of these conflicted circumstances, however, according to the imaginations of both authors Calvinism “offered the best foundation for a virtuous society” (220). 

Thuesen drafts what he calls the “Stowe-Weber Thesis”–characterized by two authors who “were complex thinkers whose deepest religious sympathies were clearly mixed” (232), and who both had been “steeped in Protestant triumphalism that equated popery with intellectual and political slavery,” but who arrived at the mutual conclusion that the positive American character traits, e.g., thrift, hard-work, intellectual cultivation, etc., were the “inevitable result” of Calvinism. Thuesen notes that both Weber and Stowe have provoked scholarly debates because their theory and judgment of Calvin/Calvinism, as Alastair Hamilton notes, “is just as difficult to demolish as it is to substantiate” (232). 

My thoughts: I think Stowe and Weber are good illustrations of “complex thinkers whose deepest religious sympathies were clearly mixed,” and Thuesen adequately demonstrates that truth and the correlating conundrum these two authors have created for scholars. 

Book Review: John Calvin’s American Legacy – Chapter 8 – “Strange Providence”: Indigenist Calvinism in the Writings of Mohegan Minister Samson Occom (1723-1792)

Chapter 7 review here. Chapter 6 review here. Chapter 5 review here. Chapter 4 review here. Chapter 3 review here. Chapter 2 review here. Chapter 1 review here. Introduction review here. Initial thoughts here.

This is the first chapter from Part III, concerning Calvin’s legacy in American letters. Denise T. Askin is the author, and she provides a thorough and thoughtful analysis of both published and unpublished writings (sermons, sermon notes, journals and personal reflections, etc.) by Samson Occom, who lived during the eighteenth-century and was an Indian and an ordained Presbyterian minister.

Occom is a fascinating character, and equally fascinating is, as Askin refers to it, his “Indigenist Calvinism”. But the true jewel of captivation in this article is Askin’s careful attention to the literary nuances found on the fruitful pages preserved from both Occom’s pen and pulpit. Askin analyzes that literary fruit, and presents in a concise, well structured article the unique style and voice resident in the writings of Occom, the Calvinist Native American. Also, she provides abundant examples of the literary tools put to good use by Occom in his writings, e.g., his use of “irony and Pauline paradox” — what Askin refers to as “earnest irony”– and prophetic voice, which “Measuring Christian society by its own standard–the gospel–Occom finds it wanting” (210).

After inspecting Occom’s sermon style, she then “[traces] the scripture-based narrative that Occom evolved over a lifetime to unify his responsibilities and his identity as both Native American and Christian,” a two-fold narrative which emphasized, on the one hand, the Creation account, that is, the Genesis narrative, and, on the other hand, the narrative of “Isaiah’s prophecy of the regeneration of Israel”; Occom emphasized this over the archetypal Calvinistic narrative–the “covenant narrative”. Askin points to this practice in order to illustrate Occom’s indigenist Calvinism, which she believes “[served] a typological purpose as significant for the continuance of his people [Native Americans] as Exodus was for the Jews and the errand into the wilderness was for the earliest Calvinists of New England.

To conclude, Askin says,

Occom’s writings reveal that he, like the Puritans, also looked through the lens of scripture and saw human events as eloquent both of God’s will and of God’s interaction with the community. He forged for his people a narrative that paralleled that of the founders of the New England colonies. . . . Occom’s indigenist Calvinist imagination saw in the flat surface of life many layers of meaning that connected his present moment to the biblical past and project it forward toward an apocalyptic future. . . . The words of Occom–in sermons, letters, and diaries–reveal the complex nature of his “strange providence” as a Native American and a Calvinist in a fragile and changing world (215).

My Thoughts: Askin’s article is great. Occom is such a fascinating character in American Church History, but what makes this article especially enjoyable is viewing Occom from a literary perspective. Oftentimes a Theologian or Church Historian will approach things from within their discipline and with what are more or less ready-made questions. However, when you change your approach, when you are challenged to view and approach a familiar subject matter from a different perspective, then, oftentimes, you find yourself asking different types of questions, or at least asking questions differently. (I’m replaying in my mind a scene from the movie Dead Poet’s Society, “I stand upon my desk to remind myself that we must constantly look at things in a different way.”) And so, I think that is what Askin has done with her article. She looks at things in a different way, asking new questions and asking old questions differently.

First Things: June/July 2012 – Life Too Inconvenient for Life – Poisonous Seed Indeed

I have subscribed to First Things for a couple years. Editor R. R. Reno pens the opening, editorial article “The Public Square” in the hard-copy publication. In the June/July 2012 publication, in “The Public Square” under the heading “Life Too Inconvenient for Life,” Reno writes:

The Journal of Medical Ethics, an altogether mainstream, peer-reviewed scholarly publication, recently published an article justifying “after-birth abortion,” a locution authors Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva use to describe killing newborns whose parents don’t want them.

“Children with severe abnormalities whose lives can be expected to not be worth living” can be “terminated,” as the Groningen Protocol in the ever-merciful Netherlands currently allows. Then the authors follow the ruthless logic of the pro-abortion position to its conclusion. “If criteria such as costs (social, psychological, economic) for the potential parents are good enough reasons for having an abortion even when the fetus is healthy,” they observe, and if we can’t give a cogent explanation why a fetus suddenly becomes a person simply by passing through the birth canal, “then the same reasons which justify abortion should also justify the killing of the potential person when it is at the stage of a newborn.”

If we can kill a healthy child in the womb for a whole range of reasons, then why not in the hospital nursery? Why not abortions “after birth”?

At first I thought the article was meant as cutting humor. The clattering machinery of the simplistic syllogisms seem positively Swiftean, a satire of our present-day moralists. Want to kill newborns? OK, OK, give me a minute or two, and I’ll give you the arguments.

But no, the editors of the Journal of Medical Ethics apparently think that these sorts of arguments should be taken seriously. They will of course say that the journal is committed to “stimulating discussion” and “airing controversial views.” What’s the harm in thinking it through? Aren’t free exchanges like this good for us? Doesn’t it help us refine our moral arguments and perhaps overcome our irrational responses of disgust and moral dismay?

In 1920, two distinguished German professors published an argument in favor of euthanasia. The argument turned on the clam  that there are some lives unworthy of life. Giubilini and Minerva use that haunting phrase, perhaps unaware of its origins. And they extend it. Their argument for “after-birth abortion” gives us permission to destroy newborns who aren’t unworthy but are inconvenient.

As Jonathan Haidt observes, our moral culture is shaped primarily by emotion. Very few people reason out moral truths. Most of us have gut reactions. The fixed points in our moral universe are the deeds so heinous we can’t imagine performing them. And I can’t imagine killing a newborn. Which is precisely what Giubilini and Minerva and the editors of the Journal of Medical Ethics want us to coolly entertain as a real option.

Lebensunwerten Lebens: life unworthy of life. The idea expanded the German imagination, and in 1939 the Nazis gassed 75,000 mentally ill and handicapped Germans. They were burdensome, inconvenient, and an impediment to their goal of racial purity. Soon they focused their attention on another impediment, whose victims are counted in the millions.

There is nothing remotely original or philosophically sophisticated about Giubilini and Minerva’s pedestrian reasoning. The editors’ rationale for publishing their article advocating “after-birth abortion” was to break new ground, to “expand” our moral imaginations, to “problematize,” as progressive professors like to say. That’s what the distinguished German professors did in 1920. That’s what our professional ethicists are doing today.

St. Paul teaches that we will reap what we have sown. This, dear readers, is a very poisonous seed indeed [Emphasis CCS].

Book Review: John Calvin’s American Legacy – Chapter 7 – Whose Calvin, Which Calvinism? John Calvin and the Development of Twentieth-Century American Theology

Chapter 6 review here. Chapter 5 review here. Chapter 4 review here. Chapter 3 review here. Chapter 2 review here. Chapter 1 review here. Introduction review here. Initial thoughts here.

Chapter 7 dovetails nicely with the preceding chapter’s consideration of nineteenth-century Calvinistic theology in America, with many of David D. Hall’s allusions for the twentieth-century fleshed out in this masterfully written article by Stephen D. Crocco, who provides the conclusion to the section on Calvin’s influence on American Theology. In hindsight, Crocco’s article is the standard by which the other two articles are plumbed and judged; each of the Theology articles were thoughtful, but Crocco’s is exquisite, and much of my review will consist of lengthy quotations.

To begin. Crocco picks up where Hall concludes, denoting that there are many “readings” of John Calvin and his respective influence, hence, the title, Whose Calvin, Which Calvinism?, which we are told in an endnote is an allusion to Alasdair McIntyre’s Whose Justice, Which Rationality? published in 1988. Crocco puts it like this:

There is simply no escaping the fact that, to one degree or another, Calvin “influenced” American Protestantism across virtually every theological spectrum imaginable, even traditions that were sustained in reaction against basic features of his thought. But questions of influence and development are notoriously complex and controversial. Put bluntly, one person’s idea of influence and development is another person’s plunge into apostasy or fundamentalism (165). 

 Crocco’s article is structured threefold; the first division discusses those who discuss Calvin’s influence on American theology, the second, which he says is “highly selective,” considers those who discuss Calvin’s legacy within the “context of the United States as a nation of immigrants,” and the third, Crocco suggests a typological reading of Calvin as a “mountain dominating a theological landscape” (166).

In Calvin studies, particularly modern scholarship, there is a distinction between Calvin and Calvinism. Crocco provides adequate coverage of this distinction, highlighting works by Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin, R. T. Kendell, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1694, and Paul Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists, and sets the stage for a round of important questions:

Any attempt to enlist Calvin into a modern theological program raises the questions: were additions to Calvin–the federalist view of the covenant or modern views of scripture–an extension or confirmation of what was important for Calvin, or were they parasitic accretions? Were the things  that were subtracted from Calvin for the twentieth-century–his views on civil government and double predestination and his anti-Romanist polemics–life-saving amputations, or did they drain the life blood of Calvin? . . . In the narratives behind all of these relationships [Augustine and the Augustinians, Edwards and the Edwardseans, Barth and the Barthians, Calvin and the Calvinists], there is considerable debate about what constitutes a tradition and, more particularly, what counts as progress or regression in it (167).

 Perhaps this dilemma might best be illustrated by the image of a person journeying on a road.  If a person is journeying on a road [the road is a reading of a person, like John Calvin, or a tradition derived/propagated from the writings and influence of said person], then what change in direction constitutes a departure from the road, that is, from the way the person was initially journeying? Or perhaps it is even more complicated than that; perhaps what constitutes a departure (progress or regression) for this person is simply traveling on the road differently. Perhaps now the person beings walking on the other side of the road. What does that imply? Is it a break from the tradition? or merely progress?

We see this type of dilemma frequently–doesn’t matter what the topic is, it is evident even within intramural dialogue regarding video games (e.g., is Doctor Wario part of the Mario lineage? or a departure from that original 8-Bit NES greatness? But wait, is 8-Bit NES considered the genesis of Mario? or is that character rightly understood as having originated from the arcade console version of Donkey Kong?)

There certainly is “considerable debate” about what constitutes a tradition, which is why Crocco goes on to say that “in a number of conflicting cases” theologians, historians, economists, theorists, etc., try to “incorporate Calvin into their narratives,” which leads to a “wax nose” type of Calvin–“The picture of a dozen or so Calvins sporting different noses is humorous but accurate” (167). Whose Calvin, Which Calvinism? Indeed.

Crocco is wise, noting  that “in addition to having a wax nose, Calvin is also a mirror that reflects the particular beliefs and agendas of those who claim him for their own” (169). It would seem, then, that how a person handles Calvin is a “tell” of what may be veiled or unveiled motives, sensibilities, presuppositions. Calvin wrote on a plethora of topics, and people frequently leverage him across a multitude of academic, spiritual, and political disciplines, and it is oftentimes the case that when people do so, rather than learning more about Calvin, we in fact learn more about the very persons discussing Calvin.

Perhaps one of the most captivating and fascinating parts of the article is Crocco’s description of the Council of the Alliance of the Reformed Churches Holding the Presbyterian System in Philadelphia in 1880. Crocco describes and analyzes the imagery and symbolism displayed on the banners representing respective nationalities and theological heritages, ranging from “Bohemia and Moravia, England and Wales, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Scotland, and Spain,” and points out the significance that “only two times Calvin was mentioned on a dozen banners”–Crocco concludes that this means that “Calvin was acknowledged as the great theologian behind these traditions. . . . [but] the banners showed that Calvin’s influence was mediated [emphasis CCS] or related to particular communities and churches by people who had special historical or ecclesiastical connections to those communities” (171). Crocco continues:

The heroes of the faith of particular nations–figures such as Zacharias Ursinus and John Knox and creeds such as the Westminster Confession, the Synod of Dort, and the Heidelberg Confession–were the paths back to Calvin and the paths forward to the broader Reformed tradition. This patter–where Calvin is acknowledged as the great theologian of the Reformed tradition whose teachings were mediated both by indigenous influences and by subsequent theological development–is at the heart of his role in the development of American theology in the twentieth century just as it was in the nineteenth, eighteenth, and seventeenth centuries.

Thus Crocco shows that Reformed theology in America is best represented by a cacophony of  theological voices, albeit, voices that are harmonizing (for the most part) with Calvin, the mutually acknowledged great theologian of the Reformed tradition. It is important to note that at different times some of the voices had a more significant role and influence, e.g. “Until the early nineteenth century, American Protestantism was most heavily influenced by the Reformed traditions coming out of England and Scotland” (172), but we also see in different pockets across American influencing “undercurrents” from Holland, France, etc. Crocco provides surveys of this theological development, recounting the histories of the men and theologies who mediated Calvin, those variegated names and universities that have been associated with the differing Calvinistic camps in the American Reformed-landscape, e.g., Old Princeton, Neo-Calvinism, Christian Reconstructionism, etc.

Despite these intramural debates, and the many debates contended by theological liberals during the past 50 years, Calvin is still “lifted up as transformationist and associated with positive social change.” However, Crocco adds, “To contend, as this chapter has done, that Calvin’s role in American theology were largely mediated does not imply that they were entirely mediated.” Calvin certainly was read. He was not merely received through said channels of mediation; Calvin’s ideas were not always trafficked through the firewall of another author or tradition (that is, socially speaking, not at the presuppositional level that occurs within every person’s private reading). Crocco lists the various published writings by Calvin that were available in America, specifically throughout the past century, and that it was especially during that century that Calvin was mediated anew by men like Karl Barth and H. Richard Neibuhr and Emil Brunner. And so Crocco closes:

Twentieth-century Protestant theologians inherited a landscape in which Calvin was in the air they breathed; he affected every horizon, and the bedrock of his thought was just below the surface of every step they took. To speak in terms of a landscape lends itself to a picture of Calvin as a mountain that dominates the geography. Images of Mount Hood (Calvin) looming above the city of Portland (American Theology) . . . Although theologians and ecclesiastical movements have grown accustomed to the inspiring, hospitable, and malleable character of his writings, history has shown that, 500 years after his birth, Calvin is still capable of pint to a God who resists all efforts to be domesticated by the church or academy. Perhaps Mount Hood’s neighbor, Mount St. Helens, provides an apt metaphor of the power that can be unleashed when God decides to speak through his gifted and faithful servants (185-86).

My Thoughts: Masterfully written; excellent research and composition. Crocco’s analysis and thought are fair and charitable (and I can only hope someday to write both as well and thoughtfully as he has in this chapter).

Book Review: John Calvin’s American Legacy – Chapter 6 – Calvin and Calvinism within Congregational and Unitarian Discourse in Nineteenth-Century America

Chapter 5 review here. Chapter 4 review here. Chapter 3 review here. Chapter 2 review here. Chapter 1 review here. Introduction review here. Initial thoughts here.

Before canon-balling in to the deep end of his article, David D. Hall opens with two quotes: The first by John Cotton, “Let Calvin answer for me,” originally given in 1637 in response to ministers questioning his orthodoxy; the second quotation by Perry Miller, who argued, in “The Marrow of Puritan Divinity,” that Jonathan Edwards was the “first consistent and authentic Calvinist in New England,” for Edwards was the first theologian with “nerve” to skip over New England theologians and considered their doctrinal source, Calvin, directly.

Hall begins his article introducing the “first-ever National Council of Congregational Churches” that met in Boston on June 14, 1865. The Council had several goals, meeting in the aftermath of the Civil War they were ambitiously looking to grow beyond their native homes in New England and deliberated over a Declaration of Faith. Although initial drafts referenced Calvinism, the final declaration did not. Hall says words like “Calvin,” “Calvinism,” and “references to the Westminster Confession” were “strikingly absent.” Hall, therefore, wonders “What were the implications of this refusal for the future of Congregationalism and, a separate but related matter, the capacity of Congregationalists to understand their own origins in the seventeenth century?” These two questions, contrasted with the pro-Calvin opening quotations, have compelling effect–the reader knows he truly is heading in to the deep end of Calvinistic discourse. Hall sets things up nicely. The article follows the separate links in a chain of confusion tethered to the “reformers’ nineteenth-century heirs within Congregationalism” (149), disclosing how this confusion, according to Hall, has been recapitulated by liberal theologians in the twentieth-century, and thus paving the path for what has led to our contemporary cloud of confusion hovering over modern Puritan studies and tis relation to Calvin and Calvinism.

Hall tackles this chain of confusion by narrating the outcome of the clash between liberal and evangelical “wings” of the New England tradition, an outcome that morphed, namely, into Unitarianism, which questioned the legitimacy and morality of Calvinism. Unitarians were no friend of Calvin, seeing Calvinism as being “arbitrary, dogmatic, metaphysical, deterministic, antimodern, of a persecuting temper” (152). Hall, then showing that Unitarianism was Congregationalism’s schism, tells the reader that what he finds remarkable (and he assures us that he is supported by modern scholarship in thinking so) is the “persisting ignorance of the Calvin of Geneva” for both Congregationalists and the Unitarian/New Haven theologians, as well as the phenomenon that Congregationalists and Unitarians shared a mutual dissatisfaction for Calvin, and Edwards for that matter, and that this view was shared in spite of the former group being the “moderates” and the latter group being the “liberals.” It would seem, then, that New England, both moderate and liberal wings, were fed up with Calvin and anything esteemed Calvinistic. How about that? So.

We see the Unitarian decrying of Calvinism in the 1820s/1830s, and then, in the1860s, we see Congregationalists side stepping the inclusion of Calvinistic verbiage in their declaration of faith, and, with the vantage point from which Hall chaperons the his readers into surveying the twentieth-century, we are then prepared to be introduced to Williston Walker’s biography of Calvin (John Calvin: The Organiser of Reformed Protestantism) and Perry Miller’s writings on New England and seventeenth-century religious thought.

In both of these authors we see some more of the recapitulated confusion referenced earlier by Hall; both of these men had unique readings of Calvin, and in Calvin saw elements that “pointed towards modernity” (159). Walker saw in Calvin the modern notion of the separation of church-and-state, while Miller traced Calvinistic colonial theology (by way of those who put emphasis on “covenant theology”) up and through the “softer, milder Calvinism of the eighteenth century and the Unitarian liberalism of the nineteenth” (160).

All of this leaves us wondering, “Which reading of Calvin is correct?” Was Calvin’s influence in America anti-modern? Or was it modern? For progressive theology? Or against it? Hall’s conclusion reminds us that these different narratives of Calvin, these different assessments of Calvin’s influence on American theology, “these crisscrossed stories . . . both have persisted into our own time,” which means that, “Paradigms–or, better, stereotypes–do indeed die hard.” It is hard to understand your origins, especially if there are contrary paradigms or stereotypes floating around.

My thoughts: Content was engaging bu the outline of material and unpacking of content made for a difficult read/made it difficult to follow. (Although, the weakness probably lies with my abilities to read critically/carefully, not Hall’s ability to write). The conclusion is good though–and should encourage anybody who does history to do so carefully. After all, if you get something wrong, that thing may tint a different person’s glasses, that inaccuracy may die hard.

Pro-God = Pro-Reality = Pro-Life

The Church is Pro-God, Pro-Reality, and Pro-Life.

The Church believes in God, in truth, in reality–“We believe in one God . . . maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible”–the Church believes in God and creation. And this belief is the foundation for a Pro-Life ethic. Social Justice for the unborn (life-in-the-womb) must be rooted in this grammar–God is the sovereign creator of heaven and earth, of that which is seen and unseen, and He alone creates and defines this (all) reality.

That being the case, what does the Creator say about in utero? Is He silent about the reality of the life of cells multiplying in a womb? Hardly–See Exodus 21, Psalm 22, 139.