Mathison, Keith A. The Shape of Sola Scriptura. Moscow: Canon Press, 2001.

KM’s The Shape of Sola Scriptura appears to be highly derivative of works by Heiko A. Oberman. KM regularly cites and footnotes Oberman works, listing five of Oberman’s works in the Bibliography: The Dawn of the Reformation (1986); Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought (1967); The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (1963); Luther: Man Between God and the Devil (1989); The Reformation: Roots and Ramifications (1994). I’ve never read anything by Oberman.

KM’s “Tradition 0, I, II, & III” lingo propels much of KM’s argumentation. The bulk of the verbiage, Tradition I, II, III, are derived from Oberman (see pp. 32-33; 133-135), the remaining term, “Tradition 0”, is an expansion by Alister McGrath of Oberman’s terminology (p. 126).

KM’s chief aim is to correct and clear-up the contemporary equivocation of Tradition I and Tradition 0. For example, KM states:

The numerous ways in which sola scriptura has been misused have provided its critics with further evidence of the practical “unworkability” of the doctrine. . . . Roman Catholic and Orthodox apologists have been effective in their criticisms in large part because of the fact that most Protestants have adopted a subjective and individualistic version of sola scriptura that bears little resemblance to the doctrine of the Reformers. As long as Protestants attempt to maintain this defective version of sola scriptura, and as long as this version of the doctrine is allowed to be identified as the Protestant position, Roman Catholic and Orthodox apologists will continue to effectively demolish it and gain frustrated seekers (p. 14).

 It is important to realize that there were two very different versions of the sola scriptura principle which were advanced during the sixteenth-century Reformation. The first concept, advocated by magisterial Reformers such as Luther and Calvin, insisted that Scripture was the sole source of revelation, the sole infallible authority, but that it was interpreted in and by the communion of saints according to the regula fidei. Tradition in the sense of the traditional interpretation of Scripture was not discarded. This is the view for which we are using the term “Tradition I.” The second concept, advocated by many of the radical Reformers, insisted that Scripture was the sole authority altogether. Not only were medieval “traditions” disregarded, but tradition in the sense of the regula fidei, the testimony of the fathers, the traditional interpretation of Scripture, and the corporate judgment of the Church were discarded as well. The interpretation of Scripture, according to this concept, was a strictly individual matter. This is the concept for which we are using the term “Tradition 0.” Unless these two positions are carefully and consciously distinguished, the kind of confusion that has prevailed in the debates of the last five hundred years will continue (p. 128).

Sola scriptura, when understood within the classical Protestant context of Tradition I, is not affected by Rome’s self-defeating criticism because it does not assert that Scripture is the only authority. It asserts that Scripture is the only inherently infallible authority. But although the Church is a fallible authority, Tradition I does not assert that this fallible Church cannot make inerrant judgments and statements. In fact, in the case of the canon of the New Testament, adherents of Tradition I would confess that the fallible Church has made an inerrant judgment. But do we believe this because a particular Church tells us so? No, we believe this because of the witness of the Holy Spirit, which was given corporately to all of God’s people and has been made manifest by a virtually unanimous receiving of the same New Testament canon in all of the Christian Churches. This is not an appeal to subjectivism because it is an appeal to the corporate witness of the Spirit to the whole communion of saints. The Holy Spirit is the final authority, not the Church through which He bears witness and to which he bears witness (pp. 318-319).

KM believes that “Tradition I” is “regula fidei as Tradition.”

KM believes that “the Church must affirm that Scripture is to be interpreted in and by the communion of saints within the theological context of the rule of faith [Tradition]” (p. 347).

KM believes that Truth (Scripture) and Tradition (rule of faith) can never be separated. There is, however, a distinct order: Scripture is the “only inherently infallible authority.”

In summary, I believe KM is essentially arguing that you cannot divorce truth from tradition—you cannot divorce Scripture from Scripture-being-interpreted-by-Christians-within-the-theological-context-of-the-rule-of-faith, e.g., “The early Church was therefore able to view Scripture and tradition as coinherent concepts” (p. 275); “The traditional apostolic rule of faith is the foundational hermeneutical context of Scripture” (p. 277); “If we confess the perspicuity of Scripture, then a confession of the ecumenical creeds inevitably follows. The ecumenical creeds are simply the written form of the confession of the faith of the universal Church. They are a confession of what the Church as a whole has read in the Scriptures” (279).

Reading this made me think of what Robert W. Jenson said in Canon and Creed, i.e., “For the sake of its integrity through history, the church must always remember that canon needs creed and creed needs canon, and that it is permitted to govern its discourse and practice by their joint import” (pp. 117-118).